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ABSTRACT 
Mammals living in more complex social groups typically have large brains for their body size 
and many researchers have proposed that the primary driver of the increase in brain size 
through primate and hominin evolution was the selection pressures associated with sociality. 
Many mammals, and especially primates, use flexible signals that show a high degree of 
voluntary control and these signals may play an important role in forming and maintaining 
social relationships between group members. However, the specific role that cognitive skills 
play in this complex communication, and how in turn this relates to sociality, is still unclear. 
The hypothesis for the communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition posits that 
cognitive demands behind the communication needed to form and maintain bonded social 
relationships in complex social settings drives the link between brain size and sociality. We 
review the evidence in support of this hypothesis and why key features of cognitively 
complex communication such as intentionality and referentiality should be more effective in 
forming and maintaining bonded relationships as compared with less cognitively complex 
 
communication. Exploring the link between cognition, communication and sociality provides 
insights into how increasing flexibility in communication can facilitate the emergence of 
social systems characterised by bonded social relationships, such as those found in non-
human primates and humans. To move the field forward and carry out both within- and 
among-species comparisons, we advocate the use of social network analysis, which provides 
a novel way to describe and compare social structure. Using this approach can lead to a new, 
systematic way of examining social and communicative complexity across species, 
something that is lacking in current comparative studies of social structure. 
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II. Historical approach 
III. Communicative roots of complex socialty and cognition  
(1) Prediction 1: primates will have more cognitively complex communication 
underpinning social relationships and hence larger brains relative to their body size than 
all other animals 
(2) Prediction 2: some primates will have more cognitively complex communication 
underpinning social relationships and hence larger brains than other primates 
(3) Prediction 3: cognitively complex communication will be more effective than non- 





 (c) Complexity of structure 
 (d) Perception 
 (e) Intentionality 
 (f) Referentiality  
 (g) Laterality 
 (h) Learning and innovation 
 (i) Arousal control 
 (j) Rewarding communication 
(4) Prediction 4: greater social complexity will be associated with greater complexity of 
cognitive skills underpinning communication 
(a) Group size 
(b) Temporal and spatial stability of social system 
(c) Group density  
(d) Member roles 
(e) Despotic and egalitarian structure  
(f) Mating system  
(g) Bondedness style 
IV. A brief review of evidence for communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition 




VIII. References  




One of the distinctive features of primates is that they have unusually large brains for their 
body size (Jerison, 1975). This observation has led to an active debate about the factors that 
selected for the evolution of large brains in primates (e.g. Barrickman et al., 2008; Barton, 
1996; Byrne & Whiten, 1989; Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980; Dunbar, 1992, 1998; Evans et 
al., 2005; Finlay, Darlington & Nicastro, 2001; Gibson, 1986; Harvey, Clutton-Brock & 
Mace, 1980; Hofman, 1983; MacLean et al., 2014; Miller, 1999; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; 
Reader & Laland, 2002; Van Schaik, Isler & Burkart, 2012). The comparative method has 
been used as a powerful tool that has enabled scientists to increase our understanding of how 
the pressures of the socio-ecological environment have influenced variation in brain size 
across primate species.  
Social explanations have centred on the role of sociality in explaining brain size 
evolution. Early studies suggested that behavioural innovation explains relative brain size 
variation in non-human primates (hereafter primates), because it is cognitively demanding as 
it requires that individuals learn flexibly from others and invent new behaviours. This 
cognitive capacity enables primates to exploit their environment in new ways and so exposes 
them to advantages of novel selection pressures (Lefebvre et al., 1997; Reader, Hager & 
Laland, 2011; Reader & Laland, 2002; Van Schaik et al., 2012; Wyles, Kunkel & Wilson, 
1983). Using ecologically relevant measures of cognitive ability such as relative and absolute 
‘executive’ brain volumes, an influential study showed that the incidence of behavioural 
innovation, social learning, and tool use correlates with brain size and cognitive capacities of 
primates (Reader & Laland, 2002).  
Another proposal that has received considerable research attention is the social 
intelligence hypothesis. This hypothesis also regarded behavioural flexibility as a key factor 
 
driving the evolution of large brains in primates (Byrne & Whiten, 1989; Reader & Laland, 
2002; Whiten & Byrne, 1997). Arguing that primate social environments are inherently 
competitive, the nature of the social environment would lead to a selection pressure for the 
evolution of ‘Machiavellian’ strategies. Using tactical deception as a defining criterion for 
this hypothesis, Byrne & Corp (2004) showed how the frequency of tactical deception 
correlates with neocortex volume in primates, suggesting that strategies of social 
manoeuvring have driven the evolution of larger brains in socially complex species. 
However, it has been argued that tactical deception derives from life in complex social 
groups and therefore it cannot drive brain size evolution. Moreover, competition and 
exploitation are detrimental to social cohesion and thus social strategies that enable large 
social groups to function cohesively may be important in explaining complex cognitive skills 
and large brains in primates (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017).  
These social explanations have been complemented by ecological hypotheses, suggesting that 
the enlarged brains and generally complex cognitive skills in primates may be explained by 
ecological factors (Powell, Isler & Barton, 2017) such as ‘extractive foraging’ (Parker & 
Gibson, 1977) and ‘cognitive mapping’ (Milton, 1988). Early studies showed that primates 
with more complex frugivorous diets have larger brains than folivorous species. Fruit is more 
widely distributed across time and space as compared to folivorous foods. Mentally tracking 
and finding the location of scattered and unpredictable foods is cognitively demanding and 
therefore primate species exhibiting greater dietary complexity are hypothesised to have 
larger brains than species exhibiting lower dietary complexity (DeCasien, Williams & 
Higham, 2017; MacLean et al., 2014). These new hypotheses have reignited the debate over 
which factors are of key importance in primate brain size evolution.  
What is generally agreed upon, even if this still needs to be debated, is that anthropoid 
social evolution is generally characterised by a relationship between the level of 
 
encephalisation and the complexity of the social system (Broad, Curley & Keverne, 2006; 
Curley & Keverne, 2005). The highest rates of encephalisation can be found in the Primates 
but also other mammalian suborders such as Hippomorpha (horses), Tylopoda (camels), 
Odontoceti (toothed whales) and the Caniniformia (dogs and seals) (Dunbar & Shultz, 2010). 
However, among mammalian species, the anthropoid primates stand out as having a 
particularly strong correlation between the complexity of the social system (typically 
quantified as group size) and brain size, and specifically with neocortex size in relation to the 
rest of the brain (the neocortex ratio). Thus in many non-primate species, a pair-bonded 
mating system rather than group size is associated with larger brain size (Shultz & Dunbar, 
2007). By contrast, in primates there is a strong relationship between group size and brain 
size (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017). This empirical finding has been taken to support the 
hypothesis that the demands of maintaining stable social bonds within social groups are 
particularly important in explaining encephalisation in primate species, as compared to other 
mammals (Broad et al., 2006; Shultz & Dunbar, 2007). The social brain hypothesis proposes 
that the social world of primates is particularly cognitively demanding and that this led to the 
evolution of increasingly large brains. The social brain hypothesis is specifically about the 
selection pressures arising from the need to create a functional, bonded social group, with 
sociality itself driven by the need to solve the ecological challenge of predation (Dunbar & 
Shultz, 2007, 2017). However, there is a lack of studies examining how this social 
complexity could function at a behavioural level (i.e. in the interactions between a specific 
pair of animals), and at the cognitive level, in terms of the cognitive processes involved in 
these interactions and in managing these relationships. This makes it unclear exactly what 
would make primate sociality more ‘cognitively complex’ than in other mammalian species 
(Dunbar & Shultz, 2010).  
 
Group size is limited both by the time demands of maintaining social relationships 
(Dunbar & Shultz, 2017) and by the cognitive demands arising from processing information 
about social relationships, which sets an upper limit on the number of social relationships that 
primates can keep track of (Dunbar, 1998). Group size is a correlate for social complexity, if 
only because the number of dyads and triads of social relationships that have to be socially 
managed increases as a power function of the number of individuals in a group. Group size is 
an emergent property of the ability of primates to maintain and coordinate social relationships 
and is used as an indicator of the complexity of social groups, as it is one of the few metrics 
available for a large number of primate species (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017). However, it is a 
relatively crude measure of social complexity, and does not provide a detailed explanation of 
why larger groups are more complex than smaller ones, or how the way in which the group is 
structured affects the number and types of relationships an individual primate has to keep 
track of. Further, there is little understanding of what it is about sociality and managing social 
relationships that is so demanding of neural computational power.  
The social brain hypothesis (as opposed to the Machiavellian version) is focused 
specifically on the need to manage social relationships in order to create functional and 
cohesive social groups (Dunbar, 1998). Studies linking social complexity and cognition 
should thus consider the relationship between managing a more complex network of 
relationships and neocortex size, not simply the quantitative relationship between group size 
and brain size. The attempts to date to quantify social complexity have focused on the more 
sophisticated social strategies that may characterise more complex social systems (Dunbar & 
Shultz, 2017). Primates with larger neocortices have higher rates of social play, more 
complex male mating strategies, higher levels of tactical deception, are more likely to form 
coalitions and have a higher frequency of social learning (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017). In 
addition, primates with larger neocortices differ from other mammals in having bonded 
 
relationships (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). Although these approaches to social complexity are 
valuable to improving our understanding of the link between social complexity and cognition, 
they cannot provide a detailed explanation as to why primates are unusually encephalised 
compared to other mammalian species, or why the relationship between encephalisation and 
group size is stronger in primates than in other mammalian species (Shultz & Dunbar, 2007).  
To understand the link between social complexity and cognition, a detailed 
understanding of how primates interact with others to build and maintain social relationships 
over time is required, as this is at the heart of what makes primate life socially complex 
(Hinde, 1976). Many mammals (e.g. ungulates such as blue wildebeest, Connochaetes 
taurinus) live in social groups but these groups are just loose aggregations, without stable 
membership or relationships among individuals (‘non-bonded social systems’). By contrast, 
primates live in groups with stable membership, where they form long-lasting and 
differentiated bonds with unrelated conspecifics (‘bonded social systems’). The quality of 
these bonds has important fitness consequences – for example, the sociality of adult female 
baboons is positively linked to infant survival (Silk, 2007).  
The high costs of competition for resources such as food and mates resulting from 
living in close proximity tends to drive animals apart, giving rise to the loose aggregations of 
many mammal species (Dunbar & Shultz, 2010). In contrast, it has been proposed that 
primates evolved strategies of social bonding to buffer themselves against the inevitable 
stresses of group living, such as feeding and mating competition (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017; 
Keverne, Martensz & Tuite, 1989) as well as reduced female fertility (Dunbar & Mac Carron, 
2019; Dunbar, Mac Carron & Shultz, 2018). The key mechanism used to create social bonds 
in primates is grooming as this releases endorphins, reducing stress in the recipient. Although 
there is an inherent difficulty in defining what a social bond is in non-verbal animals, given it 
is experienced (or felt), there is a consensus that without grooming reciprocity, it is not a 
 
bonded relationship. As a functional outcome of these social bonds, dyad partners engage in a 
variety of coordinated interactions such as mutual grooming, mutual visual contact, joint 
travel and proximity (Dunbar & Shultz, 2010). The nature of the social setting within which 
dyads interact may increase the cognitive demands behind the formation and maintenance of 
bonded relationships through grooming. Primates may form social bonds in less-complex 
social settings (e.g. smaller groups, stable groups, low-density groups, despotic social 
organisation, monogamous species) or in more complex social settings (e.g. larger groups, 
fission–fusion, high density, egalitarian, polygamous). As well as grooming, communication 
is a crucial way to coordinate and regulate social bonds in primate societies, but the role of 
communication in social bonding has received limited attention, despite its potential 
significance for furthering our understanding of how the complexity of cognitive skills is 
related to the complexity of sociality (Fig. 1). Communication is defined as use of gestures 
(non-verbal signals such as voluntary movements of the limbs or head and body postures, 
transmitted through visual, tactile or auditory channels), vocalisations (sounds made with the 
vocal tract) or facial expressions (motions of the muscles beneath the skin of the face), which 
appear to influence the receivers (Wilczynski & Ryan, 1999). Many acts might be less 
cognitively complex because they are involuntary reactions to the signaller’s internal 
emotional state. By contrast, cognitively complex communication employs signal flexibly, 
which implies that signallers have voluntary control over communication (Tomasello & 
Zuberbühler, 2002).  
The purpose of this review is to explore the cognitive complexity in communication 
that may have led to the emergence of complex social systems in primates. Here we strictly 
consider complex social systems as those where species form stable, bonded social 
relationships with unrelated individuals (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017). Social bonds of primates 
are associated with different patterns of communication through the intensity of emotional 
 
arousal, whereby individuals express their own emotional arousal and also evaluate and 
process emotional arousal in others, in order to respond adaptively (Clay & de Waal, 2013; 
Eisenberg & Fabes, 2006). Emotional arousal has been operationally defined as a state of 
physiological activation experienced as a change in heart rate (Aureli, Preston & de Waal, 
1999; Boysen & Berntson, 1989), cortisol secretion (Behringer et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 
2010) or nasal temperature (Kano et al., 2016). Arousal change is associated with 
corresponding changes in communication patterns, classified along the dimension of intensity 
or strength such as the potency of its presentation (loudness), frequency and duration 
(Burgoon et al., 1989). For instance, louder human voices are associated with a higher level 
of arousal of the signaller than quieter voices, suggesting that communication loudness can be 
used to indicate the intensity of arousal of the signaller (Scherer, 1982; Scherer & Oshinsky, 
1977). Further, communication in itself can also alter the arousal of the recipient (Patterson et 
al., 1981), in that communication associated with different levels of emotional arousal of the 
signaller is associated with different behavioural, physiological and fitness outcomes in the 
recipients (Beerda et al., 1998; Kano et al., 2016; Wascher, Scheiber & Kotrschal, 2008). 
High-arousal signals trigger a range of neurological and hormonal responses associated with 
increased heart rate and cortisol release (Beerda et al., 1998; Kano et al., 2016; Wascher et 
al., 2008), which can negatively influence the recipient’s health and survival (Capitanio et al., 
1998). By contrast, low-arousal signals can have a stress-buffering effect on the recipient. 
Thus, low-intensity signals are particularly adaptive in frequent one-on-one interactions due 
to lower stresses incurred by the interaction, and this adaptive value of low-intensity signals 
can facilitate social bonding activities and proximity (Nakayama et al., 2005; A.I. Roberts & 
Roberts, 2016). 
By definition, communication in any primate species has evolved to influence the 
accuracy and speed of responsiveness by the recipient (Chittka, Skorupski & Raine, 2009). 
 
The intensity of the arousal state in communication has recently been raised as an important 
aspect of social bonding because it influences the efficiency by which the recipients can infer 
the goal of the signaller and thus respond adaptively. In primates, forming bonded 
relationships appears to be particularly cognitively demanding, because signallers direct the 
recipient’s movement and attention towards joint goals by means of low-intensity 
communication, whereas the recipient recognises and memorises the link between the 
communication and the goal (referent) of signalling in order to respond accurately. However, 
low-intensity signals (e.g. manual, visual gestures) may contain unspecific information about 
the referent (goal) of signalling and require rich contextual information to interpret them 
(Engh et al., 2006). For instance, when a female indicates her desire for an infant to climb 
onto her back for travel, she may make an abrupt manual movement executed from towards 
to behind her body (‘Backward sweep’; Video S1). If the infant is not acquainted with the 
gesture, it may be unclear whether the female is indicating her desire for the infant to climb 
onto her back to travel, or an alternative, such as her desire for the infant to cling to her chest 
for travel. Thus, when the link between morphology (e.g. abrupt manual movement executed 
from towards to behind the female’s body) and the referent (e.g. the female’s back to be 
climbed for travel) is not known in advance, the recipient may use contextual perception to 
respond adaptively (Noordzij et al., 2009). In this type of perception, the recipient makes the 
link between the signal and the referent by using the identity of the signaller, the past 
relationship between the signaller and the recipient, and the ongoing context (e.g. mating, 
aggression, travel). 
 In circumstances when the communication takes place in complex social settings, 
which include other conspecifics than just the signaller and recipient dyad, this complexity 
can reduce contextual perception of low-intensity signals, due to the distraction of monitoring 
the third-party audience. A particularly important source of distraction comes from the 
 
presence of unpredictable social partners such as same-age partners with whom dominance 
relationships are unresolved (Aureli, 1997; Schino et al., 1988; Roberts, Chakrabarti & 
Roberts, 2019a; Roberts, Murray & Roberts, 2019b). These partners may influence the level 
of anxiety experienced by the social partner. As anxiety increases, it may be more difficult 
for the recipient to access their knowledge and infer the referent from the behaviour, leading 
to reduced coordination of social bonding (Sonnenschein, 1986). A whole range of 
behaviours are affected by the presence of a competitive audience and make contextual 
perception of low-intensity signals less effective in social coordination, including  joint 
attention and close proximity between signaller and recipient, as well as the recipient’s visual 
monitoring of the communication channel. Here we argue that as the complexity of the social 
setting increases, there will be an asymptotic limit on contextual perception of low-intensity 
signals. This limit will lead to the evolution of informative communication that, although 
cognitively complex from the perspective of the signaller, reduces the demands on contextual 
perception, by locating the referent in time and space for the recipient, to enable more 
effective formation of social bonds (Fig. 2) (A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 2016; Cullen, 1966, 
Marler, 1961). Thus, in order for the communication to be successful in conveying the 
signaller’s goal, when social complexity increases there will be selection for greater cognitive 
skills that increase the effectiveness of communication in social bonding. These skills include 
a greater ability of the signaller to understand the recipient’s comprehension state and 
respond to this knowledge by increasing information content in the signal (e.g. through 
structural complexity, intentionality, attention-getting, referentiality, innovation, and manual 
precision) (Roberts, Roberts & Vick, 2014a). 
Informative communication is characterised by a greater ease of making an 
association between the referent and the morphology of the signal by the recipient, as 
compared to non-informative signalling. In informative signalling, attention is drawn to the 
 
physical space/object or event towards which the recipient should act. This type of signalling 
reduces uncertainty by increasing the number of information units that recipient can use – in 
turn, this  reduces the number of action opportunities the recipient needs to consider  in 
deciding how to respond. For instance, if the infant does not respond to the ‘backward sweep’ 
gesture by climbing onto the female’s back, she may subsequently lower her back downwards 
or sideways in addition to making the ‘backward sweep’ gesture, in order to indicate the 
place where the infant should climb for travel. Thus, in this act of elaboration, the ‘backward 
sweep’ gesture is spatially linked to the referent to which it refers (the exposed back that 
needs to be mounted for travel), thereby reducing the infant’s need to contextually infer the 
referent among a set of potential action opportunities. As the social complexity increases 
further, the reduction in the costs of contextual perception of low-intensity communication 
through informative communication may also reach an asymptotic limit, where further 
increases in the informative value of low-intensity signals will have no bearing on the 
effectiveness of social interactions. As a result, the power of low-intensity signals to 
influence the recipient will decline and the social bond will weaken.  
So far, one type of answer has been given to the question of how primates can 
influence the recipient when a low-intensity, complex signal is unsuccessful. Classical 
ethologists proposed that one important way to make signals more effective in eliciting an 
appropriate response from the recipient is by exaggeration of intensity or amplitude (Blute, 
2006). For instance, the signaller might use a loud vocalisation simply to get its message 
across, even if the signaller and receiver are separated by a short distance. The grooming 
interaction may be mediated by use of a mechanically effective but gentle tactile gesture 
simply to make the message more transparent to the recipient, even if the signaller and 
receiver are both visually attentive. Increasing the amplitude of signals fulfils an important 
role in mediating social interactions when social attention is distracted, because high-intensity 
 
signals tend to be more specific to the ongoing context and trigger a set of neural and 
physiological responses in the recipient that lead to an appropriate response from the set of 
potential action opportunities, therefore reducing the need to infer the goal of the signaller 
from the context. For instance, in the example of the female initiating travel with the infant 
given above, one would expect that the female would communicate by lowering her back 
downwards or sideways as well as using her hand in the shape of the ‘backward sweep’ 
gesture to exert force on the infant’s body so as to cause the infant to move towards the back. 
By being physically displaced by movement/shape of the hand in the direction of the 
referent/spot on the body in the presence of the presentation of the referent/spot on the body, 
the recipient can make the link between the movement/shape of the hand and the referent. 
Thus, this type of signalling eases the recipient’s comprehension of the signaller’s goal by 
making the link between the gesture and the referent less ambiguous and more apparent (Fig. 
3).  
Although this strategy opens the way to increasing the efficiency of signals in 
conveying the signaller’s goals, on a regular one-to-one basis it may lead to separation 
between partners, as the recipient might avoid behaviour that is maladaptive if used on 
regular basis (e.g. causing overstimulation and thus increasing the recipient’s stress levels or 
anxiety when being frequently exposed to it). A further, previously unexplored way in which 
the signaller can influence the receiver is by increasing the reward value of communication. 
We will discuss in more detail in Section II how some signals have specific properties that 
can stimulate the reward system of the recipient. Light and sweeping but mechanically 
ineffective touch can stimulate the sense organs and reward centres in the brains of the 
recipient particularly strongly. Similarly, synchronised, high-amplitude, rhythmical 
vocalisations appear to be particularly stimulating for group-living primates. By reducing the 
recipient’s anxiety, the signaller can redirect the recipient’s attention from a competitive 
 
audience back onto themselves and increase the recipient’s commitment to the social 
interaction. These signals can influence the recipient’s accuracy of responsiveness by 
increasing the mental capacity of the recipient to infer the referent from the ongoing context 
through the action of social neurohormones (Domes et al., 2007; Gruber et al., 2016). For 
instance, when initiating travel, a female can couple the hand shape of the ‘backward sweep’ 
gesture with gentle sweeping contact with recipient’s body in the presence of lower back 
presentation. In this case, receiving rewarding stimulation in the presence of movement/shape 
of the hand and the presentation of the referent/spot on the body may facilitate making the 
link between movement/shape of the hand and the referent by the recipient. Thus, these 
rewarding features of communication can have a particularly powerful effect, such that the 
social cohesion of the group can be preserved in the presence of social competition. The fact 
that a wide variety of socially complex primates and humans evolved these types of 
rewarding signals means that these signals are likely to have played a particularly important 
role in social evolution. 
From this it follows that socially complex primate species must solve problems 
relating to the formation and maintenance of bonded relationships using cognitively complex 
communication. Primates must be able to employ communication flexibly and adjust their 
communication according to the comprehension of the recipient. This adjustment requires 
complex understanding of other comprehension states, contingent on the tracking of social 
relationships and the memory of past interactions, rather than moment-by-moment 
adjustments to the current behaviour. It demands an understanding of intentionality, as to 
communicate effectively the signaller has an understanding that the direct social relationship 
(that based on the strength of the social bond between the signaller and the recipient) may 
differ from those relationships inferred from third-party interaction (that between the 
recipient and a third-party audience) and that these third-party relationships can affect the 
 
recipient’s comprehension. This is equivalent to mentally modelling outcomes of different 
behavioural strategies that signallers can use towards the recipient and flexibly choosing one 
communication strategy over another to ensure that this communication strategy is effective 
in influencing the recipient. Thus, the reduced reliance on olfactory and hormonal 
determinants of affiliation in primates (Broad et al., 2006) would have been coupled with the 
increased importance of cognitively complex communication that is necessitated by living in 
complex social groups, in order to develop and maintain long-lasting social bonds with 
unrelated group members.  
This illustrates the central point that we make herein that there is a greater need to 
form and maintain bonded social relationships through cognitively complex communication 
in socially complex primate species, as compared to socially non-complex species. In 
complex social settings, conspecifics can develop and maintain bonded relationships through 
cognitively complex communication more effectively than through less cognitively complex 
communication. Thus, the evolution of cognitive skills underpinning communication in 
primates in order to meet the challenges of bondedness in complex social settings may have 
been a key innovation that facilitated the emergence of complex social systems (Dunbar & 
Shultz, 2017; Roberts et al., 2014a, 2012b). Here we propose that cognitive demands behind 
the communication needed to form and maintain bonded social relationships in complex 
social settings drive the link between brain size and sociality. To test this hypothesis, we 
propose the following set of predictions: (1) primates will have more cognitively complex 
communication underpinning social relationships and hence larger brains relative to their 
body size than all other animals; (2) some primates will have more cognitively complex 
communication underpinning social relationships and hence larger brains than other primates; 
(3) cognitively complex communication will be more effective than non-cognitively complex 
communication in mediating social relationships in complex social settings; (4) greater social 
 
complexity will be associated with greater complexity of cognitive skills underpinning 
communication. In Section II we discuss historical perspectives leading to this hypothesis. 
Section III sketches out details of communication innovations that may have enabled the 
kinds of bonded social relationships in complex social settings that we find in primates 
(summarised in Tables 1 and 2). In Section IV we briefly outline some of the empirical 
evidence from primate studies in support of the hypothesis. Finally, in Section V we describe 
how the study of communicative roots of socio-cognitive skills can be enhanced by use of 
social network analysis.  
 
II. HISTORICAL APPROACH 
Jean-Baptise Lamarck and Charles Darwin were pioneers in linking size and complexity of 
social groups with communicative complexity. Making the first argument for the greater need 
for information transfer in socially complex societies, Lamarck (1809/1963, p. 172) wrote: 
“The individuals . . . having largely increased their needs according as the societies which 
they formed became larger, had to multiply their ideas to an equivalent extent, and thus felt 
the need for communicating them to their fellows. We may imagine that this will have 
compelled them to increase and vary in the same degree the signs which they used for 
communicating these ideas”. Following from this argument, Darwin (1872/1965) insisted on 
the role of emotional expressions as a social-bonding mechanism, rather than communication 
functioning as a tool for information transfer. He argued that communication by means of the 
voice, gestures and expressions is of great importance for maintaining social relationships in 
social animals. In the twentieth century, Marler (1977, p.46) was amongst the strongest 
advocates of the link between social and communicative complexity, noting: “the richest 
elaboration of systems of social communication should be expected in intraspecific 
relationships, especially where trends towards increasing interindividual cooperation 
 
converge with the emergence of social groupings consisting of close kin”. Elaborating on 
these ideas Waser (1982, p. 118) proposed that “the value to a signaler of broadcasting 
information to recipients, and thus the degree to which selection favours specialized 
‘information-transfer’ abilities, depend[s] on the social system”. In recent years, this debate 
was extended by Maestripieri (1999, p. 56) who suggested that an important avenue of 
research extending our understanding of the link between group size and brain size “would be 
to investigate whether there is a relationship between group size, encephalization, and the 
size and complexity of the communicative repertoire across extant primate species”. More 
recently, these ideas have been developed into the social complexity hypothesis for 
communication. According to this hypothesis, groups with complex social systems demand 
more complex communicative systems to manage interactions among group members 
(Blumstein & Armitage, 1997; Freeberg, Dunbar & Ord, 2012; Leighton, 2017; Marler & 
Mitani, 1988; S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2016; Wilkinson, 2003). In complex societies, as 
compared with simpler societies, individuals interact frequently in many different contexts 
with many different individuals and also repeatedly interact with many of the same 
individuals in the social group over time (Freeberg et al., 2012). Complex communication 
systems are defined as “those that contain a large number of structurally and functionally 
distinct elements (e.g. large display repertoire sizes) or possess a high amount of bits of 
information” (Freeberg et al., 2012, p. 1787). We now build on these ideas and make a 
number of clear and testable predictions regarding the link between the complexity of 
cognitive skills underpinning communication and the complexity of sociality.  
 
III. COMMUNICATIVE ROOTS OF COMPLEX SOCIALTY AND COGNITION  
 
(1) Prediction 1: primates will have more cognitively complex communication 
underpinning social relationships and hence larger brains relative to their body size 
than all other animals 
Two key mechanisms mediate the complexity of social systems in mammals. In the 
majority of small-brained mammals (e.g. rodents), individual recognition and social 
affiliation are hormonally mediated through olfaction (Broad et al., 2006). Olfactory inputs to 
areas of the brain concerned with social reward result in priming of social affiliation by 
hormones such as oxytocin (Keverne & Curley, 2004). Individuals form an ‘olfactory 
memory’, which promotes short-term, selective affiliation towards the brood or a mate that is 
mainly necessary in the context of reproduction (Dluzen et al., 2000). Mother–infant 
affiliation ceases after weaning and reproductive partners cease affiliation after mating, 
meaning that outside of the mother–infant and mating partner bonds, social relationships are 
characterised by high levels of antagonism (Broad et al., 2006).  
In contrast, in large-brained mammals such as primates and humans, social affiliation 
occurs even in the absence of olfactory input and priming by social hormones (Curley & 
Keverne, 2005). The olfactory inputs to the areas of the brain concerned with social reward 
are downregulated and replaced by neocortical inputs that promote ‘emotional’ reward 
through individual recognition of a partner by means of integration of information from 
multiple sources (e.g. sensory cues such as facial expression) (Schultz, Tremblay & 
Hollerman, 2000). The role of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in this process also means 
that the emancipation of social affiliation from hormonal control is coupled with voluntary 
control over social bonding, rather than involuntary stimulus response modes (Broad et al., 
2006). Since social bonding is flexible it may be expected that cognitively complex 
communication will be necessary to facilitate bondedness and this will give rise to larger 
brains in primates than in other species.  
 
 
(2) Prediction 2: some primates will have more cognitively complex communication 
underpinning social relationships and hence larger brains than other primates 
The social characteristics of primate groups differ across a number of dimensions, 
perhaps the most important of which is the degree of influence of kinship on intraspecific 
social dynamics. In many primate species, the distribution of affiliative behaviour and 
agonism (aggression and alliances) is strongly influenced by kinship, in that affiliation occurs 
mainly within clusters of kin, whereas agonism is more common between unrelated 
conspecifics (Maestripieri, 1999). In these species, there may be less pressure to develop 
complex communication because there is a greater degree of influence of olfaction and 
hormonal priming on intraspecific affiliation. In contrast, in primate species where the 
influence of kinship on intraspecific social dynamics is reduced, affiliation is not limited to 
clusters of kin and can occur between any unrelated dyads. This reduction in hormonal 
priming for affiliative behaviour demands more complex communication skills. In these 
societies, complex communication facilitates the formation and maintenance of social bonds 
with unrelated and less-familiar conspecifics and this has an influence on individual success 
in the group and fitness (Maestripieri, 1999). Hence the cognitive skills underpinning 
communication and social bonding will be greater in those primate species where social 
relationships are less influenced by kinship.  
 
(3) Prediction 3: cognitively complex communication will be more effective than non- 




The referential ability underlying vocalisations suggests that important aspects of 
primate cognitive abilities related to sociality are present in calls. Primates have complex 
cognitive abilities in the vocal domain indicated by functionally referential calls that can 
reliably provide recipients with information about the presence of predators or food in the 
environment (Zuberbuhler, 2009). For instance, vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) 
use different alarm calls in association with different predators, leading to different escape 
responses in recipients; perceiving the call or the predator itself elicits the same specific 
response (Seyfarth, Cheney & Marler, 1980). Chimpanzees in captivity produce acoustically 
different food grunts in response to quality of the food eaten (Slocombe & Zuberbuhler, 
2005, 2006). Additionally, there is evidence in vocal communication for audience effects, 
where the signaller’s vocal behaviour is affected by social characteristics (such as relative 
dominance or familiarity), or the presence or absence of conspecifics. For instance, 
Gouzoules, Gouzoules & Marler (1984) showed that rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) 
produce acoustically different scream variants as a function of aggression severity, 
relatedness and relative rank of the opponent.  
However, whilst receivers can infer referents from signaller’s calls, there is less strong 
evidence that vocalisations are intentional from the signaller’s perspective. Thus, whether 
signallers attempt to inform others about the presence of external referents, or whether 
vocalisations express the emotional state of the signaller, is still a topic of intense debate 
(Crockford et al., 2012; Fischer, 2017). For instance, vervet monkeys continue producing 
alarm calls even after the recipients have responded to the signal (i.e. the monkeys have 
already escaped to safety) (Seyfarth et al., 1980). Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, continue 
producing loud pant–hoot calls upon finding patches of food, even if the whole community is 
already feeding on the food tree (Clark & Wrangham, 1994). The findings from vocal 
development in primates also indicate that certain cognitive skills in the vocal domain may be 
 
more constrained. Although primates can modify existing call types to match those of the 
partner (Watson et al., 2015), there is ample evidence for the inability of primates to invent 
and acquire new sounds from other individuals. For instance, cross-fostering of rhesus 
macaques and Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) produces no significant changes in the 
repertoire or structure of their species-typical vocalisations (Owren et al., 1992). 
Additionally, language-trained apes subjected to years of language instruction are unable to 
acquire any substantial vocabulary of words (Hayes & Hayes, 1951). This reduced breadth of 
cognitive skills in the vocal domain of communication does not reflect overall limitations of 
primate cognition, but rather difficulties in the communicative mechanism controlling vocal 
output (Lieberman, 1968). Whilst the basic vocal tract anatomy of primates would support 
production of complex sounds, the neural abilities responsible for detailed voluntary control 
of the vocalisations, and the capacity to link auditory input to corresponding motor outputs, 
are less robust in primates as compared to humans (Jurgens, 1998).  
Despite these limitations of cognitive skills in the vocal domain (Fischer, 2017) other results 
demonstrate the importance of vocalisations in sociality. The notable example of this pattern 
is the demonstration of the link between vocal repertoire size, group size and brain size across 
primates (McComb & Semple, 2005). The research showed that the size of the vocal 
repertoire in primates is associated with brain size, suggesting that the cognitive demands 
behind managing more complex relationships in large social groups precipitated the evolution 
of a large vocal repertoire and brain size. Another exception is the evidence that chimpanzees 
direct lower intensity calls towards bonded social partners (S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2019). 
Use of visual gestures combined with low-intensity calls occurs at a higher rate between 




There is a number of theoretical and empirical studies indicating that the gestural 
modality of communication is more important in facilitating social complexity than 
vocalisations (Burling, 1993; Corballis, 2003; Dunbar, 2012; Hewes, 1992, Roberts et al., 
2012b). This is because primates have greater voluntary control over their limbs than their 
vocal output and more important similarities with human communication can be observed in 
the gestural modality in many areas of cognition such as learning, symbolic communication 
and intentionality (Tomasello & Zuberbühler, 2002). For instance, whilst vocal culture has 
not yet been shown among any of the primate species (Pollick & de Waal, 2007), gestural 
cultures have been reported both in the wild (see e.g. hand clasp, leaf clipping) (McGrew & 
Tutin, 1978; Whiten et al., 1999) and in captivity (Tomasello et al., 1985). Additionally, 
whilst primates display an inability to learn vocal modifications, they have the ability to 
acquire and use symbolically many gestures of American Sign Language, which they are then 
able to transmit culturally to their offspring (Gardner, Gardner & Van Cantfort, 1989; 
Menzel, 1999). Moreover, primates do not appear to use their calls intentionally [but see 
Crockford et al. (2012) for some evidence of intentionality in primate calls], whereas they 
have the ability to use gestures intentionally in their interactions both with humans (Cartmill 
& Byrne, 2007; Leavens, Russell & Hopkins, 2005; Roberts et al., 2014b) and with 
conspecifics (Roberts, Vick & Buchanan-Smith, 2012a, 2013).  
When exploring the link between cognitive skills underlying gestural communication 
and sociality, empirical studies of manual gestures (defined as communicative movements of 
hands) suggest that manual gestures play a key role in sociality (Roberts et al., 2013). In 
particular, manual gestures without using or touching objects or the substrate (brachiomanual 
gestures) are important (Pollick & de Waal, 2007). This is because manual gestures are 
neurologically distinct from other types of gestural communication, such as bodily 
movements and locomotory gaits. Broca’s area is a region of the hominid brain with 
 
functions linked to human communication (Broca, 1861). The ape Brodmann area 44, which 
is homologous with the human Broca’s area, is enlarged in the left hemisphere (Cantalupo & 
Hopkins, 2001). In contrast to vocalisations, the monkey’s Brodmann area is activated during 
both the production and perception of manual movements (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). These 
neural structures underlying manual gestures in the great apes are homologous with the 
communication areas in the human brain, suggesting an important link between human 
communication and primate manual gestures, but not primate calls or other primate bodily 
movements (Corballis, 2003). Additionally, while many primate species commonly 
communicate with calls, facial expressions or bodily movements, manual gestures are 
typically widely used only in humans and other great apes (Byrne et al., 2017; Pollick & de 
Waal, 2007). This lack of homology between Hominoidea and all other primate species 
regarding manual gestures indicates a shift towards a more flexible and intentional production 
of manual gestures in our pre-hominid ancestors (Corballis, 2003), demonstrating the 
importance of manual gestures in facilitating complex sociality (Roberts et al., 2014a, 
2012b).  
 
(c) Complexity of structure 
There is a large amount of variation observed in the complexity of communication 
signals both across and within primate species and this complex communication (e.g. 
combinations, multimodal) may facilitate increases in social complexity. Communication 
signals can occur on their own, or they can be accompanied by the use of other signals, visual 
orientation or objects (see online Supporting Information, Video S1). Signals produced by the 
signaller can be homogenous and therefore occur in the repertoire of both the signaller and 
the recipient, or these signals can be heterogeneous, where the signal occurs in the repertoire 
of the signaller, but not in the repertoire of the recipient. Further, sequences of signals can 
 
have a varied composition, or contain repeated signals. In primates, a large complexity of 
signals is often interpreted as indicative of a greater underlying complexity of the cognitive 
skills involved in learning and flexibly producing this complex communication. One view is 
that complexity in communication is adaptive because it is more informative for the recipient 
than less-complex signals, which in turn influences the efficiency with which the recipient 
can respond to communication (Dawkins & Guildord, 1997; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). For 
instance, facial expressions are processed independently in the amygdala giving rise to 
largely involuntary perceptions of another’s communicative intent. However, combinations 
of facial expressions with directional cues (gaze direction and pointing gesture) are integrated 
in the premotor cortex, enabling the recipient to evaluate more consciously the expectation of 
signaller’s intent than gained from processing of facial expression alone (Conty et al., 2012). 
Thus, combinations of pointing gestures and gaze with facial expressions are more 
informative to the recipient than facial expressions alone and this enables the recipient to 
make more adaptive decisions about how to respond. This indicates that complex 
communication could play an important role in regulating social interactions in complex 
social systems, where different types of signalling have different but complementary 
functions.  
There are however, many different ways in which the signaller can achieve a greater 
efficiency of communication through the complexity of their signalling in complex social 
settings. The complexity of structure in the form of discrete signals (with no intermediate 
forms between adjacent elements) or fluid signals that are not rigidly distinctive (signals that 
grade and change on a continuum from one prototypical form to another) (Marler, 1976) has 
also been linked to communicative and cognitive abilities (Roberts et al., 2012b). In graded 
communication, the boundaries between the signal types are unclear and the signal types 
share many similar structural traits and components. This greater complexity of structure 
 
demands a greater degree of control by the signaller in the production of the precise form of 
communication. When the structure is flexible, primates create the structure of signals that 
they use, which may enable them to create more informative communication when social 
complexity increases as compared to discrete signalling. Whereas in many mammal species, 
distinctive signals are inflexible and genetically determined, in primates many distinctive 
signals are flexibly produced. Production of these signals requires flexibility because these 
signals only loosely originate from pre-existing morphological forms. Thus, greater 
complexity of communicative structure (i.e. flexibly produced graded and distinctive 
repertoires) may be important sources of information in socially complex species. 
 
(d) Perception 
The ability to perceive communication is a critical aspect of social interactions 
(Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013). The overall structure of communication can influence the 
efficiency of communication processing. As the level of distinctiveness in repertoire 
increases, the association of the communication type with a specific goal or intention 
increases (Cottrell et al., 1968; Zajonc & Sales, 1966). Thus, for the recipient, processing the 
content of a discrete signal and responding appropriately is relatively straightforward, as each 
signal is associated with a specific type of response. By contrast, for graded communication, 
a greater variety of signal types and forms are used in relation to specific goals or intentions. 
As compared to discrete signals, processing the content of graded signals and responding 
appropriately is a more cognitively complex task for the recipient and demands a greater 
degree of voluntary control underlying perception (Leavens et al., 2004; Pollick & de Waal, 
2007). Thus, the perception of graded signals in primates could be constrained and there will 
be an upper limit to the number of relationships that individual primates can maintain through 
these signals. If the number of individuals in a group becomes too large, it may become more 
 
difficult for individuals to interact through graded signals with all group members. Given the 
greater processing demands of graded communication, there may be a greater capacity for 
perception of these signals in species that maintain complex social groups.  
 
(e) Intentionality 
Intentionality is another characteristic of communicative complexity that may enable 
primates to coordinate behaviour effectively in complex social settings. In intentional 
communication, the signaller has a goal and uses informative communication that refers to 
the role of the recipient in attaining the desired goal (Tomasello et al., 1985). Intentional 
communication may be operationalised in the form of goal persistence, response waiting or 
sensitivity of the signaller to the recipient’s attentional state when producing acts of 
communication. For instance, the signaller indicates through the communication what the 
recipient should do and the recipient produces a response which matches the goal of the 
signaller as conveyed in the communication, enabling social behaviour to be coordinated (e.g. 
the recipient changing their behaviour from grooming to travel) (Golinkoff, 1986, 1993). 
Such communication shows the ability of the signaller to understand that the recipient is an 
intentional being with a comprehension state which may differ from their own, but which can 
be altered by communicative behaviour (Tomasello, Hare & Fogleman, 2001). Intentionality 
in communication is indicated by persistence, where signallers continue to communicate by 
substituting original signals with new signals if the initial response to the gesture does not 
adhere to the goal of the signaller (Bates, Camaioni & Volterra, 1975). For instance, if the 
recipient is not responding in the manner that matches the goal of the signaller during a 
grooming initiation, or the response is incorrect, the signaller can use another gesture to elicit 
grooming. Communicative persistence can thus improve the efficiency of social bonding 
between two individuals because it increases the likelihood that the recipient will understand 
 
more accurately the signaller’s goal and thus respond appropriately to communication, even 
if the initial response by the recipient does not match the signaller’s goal. 
 
(f) Referentiality  
Another key function of communication that would facilitate social bonding alongside 
increases in social complexity is the ability of the signaller to influence the behaviour of the 
recipient by directing their movement and attention towards either the self (reference to the 
signaller), other (reference to the recipient) or the immediate environment (reference to the 
location in the external environment or third party). Communication is identified as 
referential when the referent is consistently associated with the signal form and the signal 
form consistently elicits a congruent response to the signal from the recipient (Seyfarth et al., 
1980). In instances of referential signalling, there is coordination of attention and 
communication between the signaller and receiver to a referent, a goal and to one another, 
providing evidence that signallers act purposefully to communicate about the referent. 
Primate signals, such as bodily gestures and vocalisations can draw the recipient’s movement 
and attention to the signaller (Hopkins, Taglialatela & Leavens, 2007; Leavens et al., 2004; 
Roberts et al., 2014a,b). Furthermore, primates can draw the attention and movement of the 
recipient to the recipient themselves, by the use of directional manual gestures. For instance, 
when primates are grooming, signallers sometimes indicate to recipients that they need to 
move a specific part of their body, in order that the signaller can groom a particular body area 
(e.g. for the recipient to raise their arm so the signaller can groom under their arm). Signallers 
can use distal, visual gestures (received through visual contact) to communicate this 
information and this gesture could be viewed as having characteristics of referential 
signalling (e.g. ‘limp extend’, see video clip at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ut3Gu9Eoqjk; 
Roberts et al., 2014a,b). Camaioni (1993) argued that this type of visual gesturing may have 
 
greater cognitive complexity than either tactile (received through tactile sensation) or 
auditory (received through hearing) gestures. Visual gestures demand that the signaller sees 
the recipient as capable of comprehension that the interaction can be causally influenced by 
distal means. By contrast, tactile or auditory gestures may exercise a direct causal effect on 
the recipient that may be cognitively less complex. In this context, primates may specify 
information contained in distal, visual gestures by physically touching the spot to be moved 
by the recipient if the visual gesture was unsuccessful in conveying the goal of the signaller, 
providing further evidence for the referential nature of this type of signalling (Roberts et al., 
2013). Thus, this capacity to refer to entities external to the self can increase the efficiency of 
social coordination by increasing the ability of the recipient to identify the goals of the 
signaller regarding changes in the recipient’s behaviour (S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2019).  
 
(g) Laterality 
The ability to coordinate social relationships in primates in order for the complex 
group to function as a cohesive whole (Dunbar & Shultz, 2017), may be influenced by 
laterality defined as dominance of one side of the brain in controlling particular activities or 
behaviours (Fitch & Braccini, 2013). An important distinction between the left and right 
hemispheres (and hence opposite perceptual fields) is that the right brain processes the 
emotional content/relevance of signals faster than the left side does. As a result, animals may 
approach, watch each other or fight with the opponent preferentially in the left visual field 
(Casperd & Dunbar, 1996). There is a widely documented hemispheric bias in the use of 
primate manual gestures, where left-handed gestures are controlled through the right 
hemisphere and right-handed gestures are controlled through the left hemisphere. In humans, 
right-hemisphere-controlled manual gestures are more emotionally expressive than left-
hemisphere-controlled manual gestures (Sackeim, Gur & Saucy, 1978). Left-handed gestures 
 
can lead to attentional and behavioural convergence by inducing compatible affect between 
two interacting individuals (Owren & Rendall, 2001). By contrast, right-handed gestures can 
increase the perceptual salience of referents, in order to draw the recipient’s attention 
(Roberts et al., 2019b). For instance, in humans, right-handed gestures are more effective in 
accurately pointing out the target of communication than left-handed gestures. By increasing 
the accuracy of manual indication (Mutha, Sainburg & Haaland, 2010), right-handed gestures 
can spatially disambiguate a referent among a set of potential targets and coordinate social 
interactions more effectively. For instance, in contexts of antagonism, recruitment of support 
from bonded social partners may depend on the ability of the signaller to indicate to the 
recipient precisely that they are the target of a gesture (Video S2). Further, right-handed 
gestures made in the context of grooming can spatially disambiguate to the recipient which 
body part they should move, and this would aid the efficiency of establishing social bonds 
with the recipient by reducing the risk of miscomprehension. The capacity to coordinate 
movement and attention through increased precision of manual indication by use of right-
handed gestures is one characteristic of the complex cognitive skills that may lead to 
increased social complexity, by improving the ability of the recipient to respond accurately to 
communication (Roberts et al., 2019b). For instance, when social bonds are weaker, meaning 
dyad partners are not engaged in mutual grooming, right-handed gestures are more likely to 
elicit a response and reciprocity to grooming, relative to left-handed gestures.  
 
(h) Learning and innovation 
Communication innovation (creating new signals) and communication learning 
(copying or modification) are two complementary processes that may facilitate social 
bonding when social complexity increases. The complexity of cognitive skills underlying 
these processes in primates is much debated as many different cognitive mechanisms have 
 
been proposed as being involved in innovation and learning (McGuigan et al., 2017). 
However, researchers agree that these skills require a high degree of voluntary control to 
facilitate their operation (Ruch, Zürcher & Burkart, 2018). Learning and innovation of 
communicative signals give rise to distinct patterns in the overlap of communicative 
repertoires, with both homogeneity (presence of the same signal in the repertoire of both 
signaller and recipient) and heterogeneity (presence of the signal in the repertoire of the 
signaller but not in the repertoire of the recipient) occurring within dyads. Many different 
hypotheses have been proposed to explain patterns of homogeneity in the repertoire of 
gestures in primates [see Liebal, Schneider & Errson-Lembeck (2018) for a review]. Building 
on studies of gesture acquisition in humans, we propose that homogeneity in repertoire occurs 
as a result of learning by recipients over repeated instances of dyadic interactions in which 
they assign a specific referent to heterogeneous gesture forms (Roberts et al., 2019b; Roberts 
& Roberts, 2017). For instance, a female chimpanzee may sweep her arm backwards towards 
the infant whilst simultaneously lowering her back to indicate desire to travel. Backward 
sweep can over time reliably predict lowering of the back and hence desire to travel (Video 
S1). Over repeated instances of these interactions, backward sweep may become associated 
with the desire to travel when lowering of the back is absent (see e.g. Video ‘backward 
sweep’, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPLaw032j7o). In this way manual visual 
gestures (backward sweep) are derived from mechanically effective but gentle tactile gestures 
(physically sweeping the infant onto the lowered back). In this case, the infant first makes a 
link between the shape and movement of the hand/arm and referent (lowered back) in a 
tactile domain, and transfers this association to a visual domain (the shape and movement of 
the hand/arm executed without tactile contact in the presence of a lowered back). Over time 
dyad partners move away from salient gestures (e.g. ‘backwards sweep’ and ‘lowering back’ 
together) and towards less salient gesturing (e.g. ‘backwards sweep’ only) (see Fig. 3). The 
 
overlap (homogeneity) of repertoire arises as the gesture/referent link becomes gradually 
integrated in the memory of the recipient in instances of repeated dyadic interactions. Making 
this link causes automatic mapping between the signal and the referent each time the signal is 
reproduced and observed, thus reducing cognitive demands on contextual perception. For 
instance, signals can encode the space towards which to act and the space subsequently 
becomes referenced in an emotional signal that is only intelligible and referent specific 
between partners with a history of prior interaction. Thus, homogenous repertoires are a 
product of social-bond formation that are highly efficient in coordination between dyads with 
overlapping interests (Dawkins & Guilford, 1997; Wittgenstein, 1953).  
On the other hand, where social complexity increases, these same patterns of 
gesturing directed at bonded social partners may become less effective when directed at 
partners with whom social bonds are weaker. Although heterogeneous communication 
contains attention-getting properties that increase the likelihood that the recipient will pay 
attention to the signaller (Cullen, 1966, Marler, 1961), there is evidence in chimpanzees that 
single heterogeneous gestures are less likely to receive a response from a partner (Roberts & 
Roberts, 2017). Further, in humans heterogeneous communication demands greater skills of 
contextual perception to process (Noordzij et al., 2009). As a result, recipient may experience 
difficulty in accessing their knowledge and inferring the signaller’s referent from the history 
of past interactions. This may lead to overgeneralisation of the referent and 
miscomprehension between partners, which in turn may lead to reduced opportunities for 
social bonding. Thus, when social complexity increases, signallers may use informative 
communication to increase the recipient’s knowledge of the referent of the gesture and hence 
increase likelihood that they will respond (Nakayama et al., 2005; A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 
2016). For instance, as the signaller clarifies its referent, in repeated instances of 
miscomprehension, the link between the referent and signal is shaped from the signaller’s 
 
pattern of repetition and elaboration in relation to the recipient’s behaviour towards the 
referent. If the recipient shows complete miscomprehension (e.g. lack of response to the 
initial gesture), the signaller elaborates through communication means that refer to the role of 
the recipient in the interaction (e.g. using a tactile gesture to move an infant’s body towards 
the female back to climb for travel). If the recipient shows partial miscomprehension (e.g. 
approaches half-way), the signaller repeats the initial gesture (Roberts et al., 2013). In 
addition, rewarding features of signalling (e.g. mutual visual contact accompanying use of 
signals, light sweeping touch, soft vocal and non-vocal sounds, high intensity synchronized 
calls) can also increase the ability of the recipient to recognise and learn gesture–referent 
links (Gruber et al., 2016). As the rewarding value of the communication increases, it is more 
likely to be responded to by the recipient, in turn leading to more effective social bonding. 
This process leads to a positive feedback loop whereby opportunities for learning and social-
bond formation in complex social settings originate in the need to reduce cognitive demands 
on contextual perception through informative and rewarding communication (Fig. 4).  
 
(i) Arousal control 
Flexibility in modifying arousal underpinning communication may be important to 
regulating social relationships in socially complex species, but such flexibility requires 
greater cognitive skills than the use of a simpler communication system in an inflexible way 
(Liebal & Oña, 2018; S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2016). Voluntary control underpinning 
communication is seen when signallers suppress their pre-potent drive to express high 
emotional arousal through high-intensity communication and instead use low-intensity 
signals to communicate (Tops & Boksem, 2011). The ability to inhibit pre-potent responses 
correlates with prefrontal cortex volume and depends on Brodman area 10 brain regions 
which underpin complex cognitive processing (Passingham & Wise, 2012). Reducing the 
 
arousal associated with communication can facilitate a greater level of responsiveness in the 
recipient because it creates the perception of a positive, fitness-rewarding intent of the 
signaller (Mendl, Burman & Paul, 2010). Thus, low-intensity communication fosters trust 
that the relationship will not be compromised through a random act of aggression and this 
type of signalling may be especially important in circumstances when the dominance 
relationships have been unresolved, as is often the case in more egalitarian, bonded species 
(Maestripieri, 1999). Thus, by reducing the arousal associated with communication, signallers 
can be more successful in eliciting a response from the signaller without resorting to the 
higher arousal forms of communication designed to elicit a response from an unresponsive 
recipient (Mendl et al., 2010). Whilst in many instances reducing arousal can be 
advantageous, increasing arousal can also demand voluntary control over communication and 
can be beneficial in complex social settings. This ability to control high-intensity arousal may 
be particularly evident when stopping and pausing high-intensity communication acts to 
prevent overstimulation of the recipient and therefore increase opportunities for social 
bonding.  
 
(j) Rewarding communication 
In primates, rewarding communication may play a particularly important role in 
mediating social relationships when social complexity increases. This type of communication 
may create a psychopharmacological environment that enhances the recipient’s commitment 
and attention to the social interaction by reducing their stress. For instance, a mild sweeping 
touch as well as more intense tactile contact (Video S3) can act as a stimulus that has the 
potential to activate neural sensory afferent fibres (C fibres) involved in the release of a suite 
of neurohormones that act on the reward system.  
 
Further, high-intensity, synchronised vocalisations accompanied by loud, rhythmic, 
auditory gestures such as drumming (Video S4) or clapping 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-T8qJ9D1-g8) can trigger the release of social 
neurohormones on a larger scale similar to those released by tactile gestures (Chanda & 
Levitin, 2013). Through increasing pleasure from the interaction, rewarding communication 
can facilitate comprehension when the dyad partners have weaker social bonds and therefore 
the recipient is not willing to respond to communication. In this case, rewarding features of 
communication can facilitate making of the link between the referent and the signal more 
effectively than when the communication does not contain the rewarding features in the 
signalling.  
 
(4) Prediction 4: greater social complexity will be associated with greater complexity of 
cognitive skills underpinning communication 
(a) Group size 
Within primates, large groups are assumed to be more socially complex than small groups, as 
there are more relationships to track, and individuals must spend an increasing amount of 
their time servicing their social relationships, in order to enable large groups to function as 
stable, functionally cohesive units (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). However, there is currently no 
standard way to compare social complexity across groups of different sizes, and we have 
little understanding of how the patterning of social relationships changes with increasing 
group size. In smaller groups, primates may be able to form relatively strong ties with all 
group members, with frequent interactions based on multiple different behaviours such as 
grooming, facial expression, gestures, vocalisations and proximity. However, as group size 
increases, the ties primates have with other individuals will become increasingly weak due to 
the demands imposed by the requirement to monitor a more dynamic and complex social 
 
environment. These weaker, indirect ties are cognitively complex to manage, and this is 
especially true in fission–fusion social systems, where the frequency of interaction between 
two individuals will be much lower than in stable groups (Barrett, Henzi & Dunbar, 2003). 
Thus, in larger groups one may predict that there will be an increasing need for flexibility in 
communication. Further, primates must be able to use different communication strategies and 
behaviours flexibly to maintain ties of different strength. Finally, it could be predicted that 
the structuring of the group may change, with an increasing number of sub-groups forming in 
larger groups.  
 
(b) Temporal and spatial stability of social system 
One of the main variations in different social systems is in the degree of temporal and spatial 
stability shown in group size and composition. In fission–fusion social systems, the broader 
group or community changes its size by means of the fission and fusion of subunits (known 
as parties or sub-groups) according to both activity (e.g. resting, feeding) and distribution of 
resources (Aureli et al., 2008). The term ‘fission–fusion dynamics’ refers to the extent of 
variation in spatial cohesion and individual membership in a group over time (Amici, Aureli 
& Call, 2008). Some animal groups have a low degree of fission–fusion dynamics in that the 
membership of the group is temporally and spatially stable, and thus all individuals will 
typically encounter every member of the group every day (Aureli et al., 2008). By contrast, 
other animal groups have a high degree of fission–fusion dynamics (Aureli et al., 2008). In 
these groups, individuals form socially and geographically circumscribed communities, 
within which they associate in temporary subgroups (‘parties’) that vary in size, composition 
and duration (Amici et al., 2008). Individuals in the wider community may thus only see each 
other at infrequent intervals, often weeks apart, but each individual can recognise members of 
their own community and is capable of maintaining long-term relationships with these 
 
individuals (Barrett et al., 2003). Tracking these indirect relationships is hypothesised to be 
cognitively demanding, as in fission–fusion systems individuals must be able to retain and 
manipulate information about others whom they see only infrequently, as compared to 
systems with groups that are stable spatially and temporally where members see each other 
every day (Barrett et al., 2003).  
In a fission–fusion social system, the cognitive demands behind monitoring social 
relationships based on irregular interaction may cause primates to experience greater 
distraction resulting in weaker social bonds than in stable social systems (Barrett et al., 
2003). Thus in a fission–fusion social system, there may be a greater need for flexibility in 
communication through the use of differentiated communication strategies relative to a stable 
social system.  
In addition, group size influences the underlying social structure and changes patterns of 
communication, so understanding the influence of group size is important in examining the 
influence of social organisation on the level of social complexity individual animals have to 
deal with. Increasing group size in a stable species will result in individuals simply 
encountering more individuals each day, whereas increasing community size in fission–
fusion species will result in animals having to keep track of more indirect relationships with 
whom interactions may be infrequent (Barrett et al., 2003). Thus, the influence of group size 
on the patterning of social relationships and communication should be greater in fission–
fusion than stable groups, as there are more differentiated social relationships in fission–
fusion compared to stable social systems. 
 
(c) Group density  
Group density refers to the number of individuals per square kilometre who are members of 
the same social unit (e.g. the same group). In denser groups, where the number of individuals 
 
who are in direct close proximity and direct social interaction is greater than in less-dense 
groups, the number of third-party social relationships in the immediate audience that 
individuals must track increases (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). Thus we can predict that it will 
become increasingly difficult for an individual to adjust their behaviour in denser groups, and 
that primates in denser groups will therefore demonstrate an asymptotic limit on how many 
social relationships they can track. For instance, in denser social groups, the difficulty of 
adjusting behaviour to a large number of third-party relationships may precipitate the 
evolution of broadcast communication that can bond interactants on a larger scale, without 
the need for dyadic one-on-one social bonding (S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2016). In 
particular, gestural communication in primates exhibits greater flexibility than vocal 
communication, and this may be shown in the extent to which primates are capable of using 
gestures and vocalisations flexibly according to the social situation (Corballis, 2003; Fitch, 
2010; Killin, 2017; Sterelny, 2012). Examining how the density of social groups is associated 
with communicative complexity can thus provide insight into the cognitive complexity 
involved at the micro-level of managing social relationships.  
 
(d) Member roles 
The position and network characteristics of individuals vary by age, sex and dominance rank, 
meaning that these characteristics affect the patterning of social relationships, and the roles 
that different individuals play in the group as a whole. However, there is considerable 
variation in the extent of the sex, age and rank differences in sociality in different populations 
of primates (Lehmann & Boesch, 2008). The role individuals play in the network will 
influence the complexity of the social setting within which they interact, and hence the 
cognitive demands of recalling information about individual identity of social partners in 
different social roles and in different contexts (Conty & Grèzes, 2012; Roberts & Roberts, 
 
2017; S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2019). For instance, when the risk of mortality or injury is 
high, some males may adopt the role of dominant ‘protector’ males of vulnerable individuals 
who may stay in closer proximity to them (Altmann, 1979; DeVore & Washburn, 1963; 
Hockings, Anderson & Matsuzawa, 2006; Otali & Gilchrist, 2006; Reynolds, 1963). When 
individuals play many different roles in the network, there may be greater difficulty involved 
in the formation and maintenance of social bonds and hence a greater need for more flexible 
communication. 
 
(e) Despotic and egalitarian structure  
In primate societies, a distinction can be made between: (1) despotic social relationships 
based on a strong influence of the dominance hierarchy, where the dominant individual 
always supplants or antagonises the subordinate individual over access to resources but is 
never supplanted or antagonised by the subordinate; and (2) egalitarian social relationships 
where the dominance relationships are more unresolved and thus social partners are equally 
likely to supplant or antagonise social partners (Goodall, 1986). In egalitarian species, there is 
a greater need for primates to keep track of their own relationships with the third-party 
audience, as changes in these relationships could have implications for the likelihood that 
these conspecifics will engage in contests over access to resources (Ay, Flack & Krakauer, 
2007; Flack et al., 2006). The need to track social relationships with a third-party audience in 
egalitarian species will lead to a greater difficulty in focusing on a signaller and hence weaker 
social bonding, which will demand that there is greater cognitive and communicative 
complexity underpinning social bonding. 
 
(f) Mating system  
 
In some mammals, females form an enduring, life-long ‘pair bond’ with a mating partner. In 
other mammals, females may form a ‘pair bond’ for shorter time periods such as one 
reproductive season or just a few days during a single reproductive period (e.g. chimpanzees) 
(Goodall, 1986). In some taxa, ‘pair bonds’ have been seen as a baseline of social complexity 
(primates: Dröscher & Kappeler, 2013), whereas in others, they have been considered as a 
very complex form of sociality (bats: Pitnick, Jones & Wilkinson, 2005; ungulates: Shultz & 
Dunbar, 2005). Whereas pair-living may be viewed as a simpler form of sociality in smaller 
social groups, pair-living in complex social groups and especially within polygamous or 
promiscuous societies may be more cognitively demanding. Within polygamous/promiscuous 
species such as chimpanzees, the cognitive demands behind maintaining pair bonds are high 
because of the distraction imposed by the presence of alternative mating opportunities (e.g. 
mating with dominant males), which would require greater cognitive skills underpinning 
communication with the pair-bond partner than maintaining pair bonds in simpler social 
settings.  
 
(g) Bondedness style 
Some socially and cognitively complex primates (e.g. great apes such as chimpanzees, 
gorillas and humans) are based on male bondedness, as females disperse, whereas others are 
based on female bondedness, as males disperse (e.g. baboon–macaque–guenon group)  
(Greenwood, 1980; Hill, Bentley & Dunbar, 2008; Kudo & Dunbar, 2001; Lehmann & 
Dunbar, 2009). Both males and females form equitable social bonds which require 
remembering previous experiences with the partner, and making decisions about how to 
compete based on small differences in resource-holding potential. Unlike in female-bonded 
groups, primates in male-bonded groups face greater cognitive challenges related to social 
bonding with unrelated conspecifics, such as the need to recognise bondedness in the absence 
 
of a shared history of association with the mother. Managing these social relationships 
ineffectively may have negative fitness consequences, in terms of a high risk of injury or 
death as result of physical conflict. Male-bonded social systems may also demand a greater 
need for monitoring of third-party relationships due to the greater risks imposed by a third-
party audience. In these societies, animals may experience greater distraction from social 
bonding with a partner and hence weaker social bonding. Thus, it would be predicted that in 
male-bonded species there would be greater skills of complex cognition underpinning 
communication to form and maintain bonded relationships when compared with female-
bonded social systems.  
 
IV. A BRIEF REVIEW OF EVIDENCE FOR COMMUNICATIVE ROOTS OF 
COMPLEX SOCIALITY AND COGNITION 
Most of our knowledge about the link between sociality and primate communication 
comes from studies of gestural behaviour in chimpanzees, as this is the great ape species 
whose gestural communication has been studied most intensively (Byrne et al., 2017; 
Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014; Pika & Mitani, 2006; Roberts et al., 2014a; Tomasello & Frost, 
1989). For instance, the gestural communication of the Sonso group of Budongo (Uganda) in 
East Africa, with a special focus on adults, was described by S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts 
(2016). They found that gestural communication is associated with the duration of time spent 
in proximity. These observations were later supplemented by observations of intentional use 
of gestures in relation to proximity (A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 2019a). Chimpanzees that spent 
longer periods of time in proximity used persistence sequences at a higher rate compared to 
chimpanzees that spent shorter periods of time in proximity. Moreover, recent studies showed 
that a larger repertoire of gestural communication occurs between dyad partners who spent a 
longer duration of time in proximity, as compared to dyad partners who spent a shorter 
 
duration of time in proximity (Roberts et al., 2019a). Further, chimpanzees who spent shorter 
periods of time in proximity appear to engage in rewarding communication more often than 
chimpanzees who spent longer periods of time in proximity (A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 2019a). 
Chimpanzees produce ‘synchronised high-intensity pant–hoots’ (Video S4) – a form of 
communication where loud auditory gestures (e.g. drumming made by hitting a tree trunk 
with the feet) are responded to by the joint vocal reaction of a wider audience (S.G.B. 
Roberts & Roberts, 2016). Chimpanzees also produce tactile gestures that can be responded 
to by turn-taking episodes of visual or tactile gestures (Video S3) (A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 
2019a). Both of these communication types appear to occur between pairs of individuals that 
spent a short time duration in close proximity (A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 2019a; S.G.B. 
Roberts & Roberts, 2016). These behaviours are shown to reduce stress in recipients, thus 
influencing social bonding. 
From this, it follows that chimpanzees can flexibly modify their communication in 
relation to the duration of time they spend in proximity to others. Differentiation in 
communicative strategies in relation to proximity shows that chimpanzees have social 
awareness, and can gesture flexibly in relation to the strength of the social bond with the 
partner (Schneider, Liebal & Call, 2017). However, the more informative data source with 
regard to the link between social and communication complexity comes from examining the 
communicative underpinnings of bondedness, or the degree to which chimpanzees engage in 
social interactions directly. These data demonstrate that bonded relationships in larger parties 
are maintained through cognitively complex communication more effectively than through 
less cognitively complex signalling (Roberts, 2018). For instance, right-handed gestures are 
believed to be more cognitively complex than left-handed gestures because they are linked to 
greater cortical control over motor actions in terms of the ability to learn and flexibly adjust 
 
manual movement, enabling more effective comprehension and learning of communication 
by the recipient (Mutha, Haaland & Sainburg, 2012).  
Right-handed gestures have been shown to play an important role in maintaining 
bonded relationships in complex social settings. The bonded social relationships in average 
parties (five individuals) for East African chimpanzees appear to be maintained through left-
handed visual gestures. Since the interests of the signaller and the recipient in social bonding 
in these parties coincide, chimpanzees use low-intensity, visual left-handed gestures to 
manage social relationships (Dawkins & Guilford, 1997). However, when the complexity of 
the social setting increases, monitoring of the third-party audience can cause distractions in 
the joint attention between the signaller and recipient. In turn, this leads to a decrease in 
social bonding, as measured by mutual visual attention, mutual grooming and proximity 
between the signaller and the recipient (Roberts, 2018). When the size of the party increases 
from approximately five individuals to eight individuals, visual right-handed gestures can 
enable social bonding in this more complex social setting. When the size of the party reaches 
13 chimpanzees, signallers adapt to the increasing social complexity by increasing their 
reliance on more intense left-handed gestures (tactile, auditory) that incorporate a rewarding 
property in signalling and exploit similar mechanisms to grooming. This also suggests that as 
the number of social bonds based on reciprocated grooming increases, it eventually reaches 
an asymptotic limit where these types of relationships cannot be maintained in larger social 
parties, due to the time and cognitive demands of maintaining them (Dunbar, 2018). In order 
to overcome this limit, chimpanzees may use rewarding gestures to facilitate social 
interactions in the absence of reciprocated grooming. By having rewarding properties, these 
gestures facilitate greater social complexity by redirecting the recipient’s attention away from 
the wider audience and back to the signaller. This means that signallers can coordinate social 
interactions such as travel more effectively, as compared to other types of signalling. Another 
 
piece of evidence in support of the notion that bondedness in complex social settings is 
facilitated by cognitively complex signalling comes from examining the link between 
communicative persistence and sociality. Recent data shows that in larger parties where the 
social bonds are weaker and chimpanzees engage in mutual grooming for shorter periods, 
communicative persistence facilitates bonded relationships based on grooming (Roberts, 
2018). This research clearly shows how cognitively complex behavioural strategies can shape 
social bonding in response to increases in social complexity. 
Whilst we have increasingly good insight into various aspects of cognitively complex 
communication in relation to complexity of sociality, the lack of ability to infer causality in 
observational studies may make it difficult to draw inferences about the presence and form of 
communication that facilitated life in complex social groups in our hominin ancestors (Fitch, 
2005). Some of the most compelling evidence of the influence of cognitively complex 
communication on social coordination comes from experimental studies of language-trained 
apes. In a task that required the use of communication to obtain hidden food that could not be 
obtained individually, language-trained chimpanzees using communicative persistence to 
correct experimenters’ understanding about the location of hidden food were able to obtain 
the food much faster, as compared to chimpanzees who did not use such complex 
communication (Roberts et al., 2014b). Since social coordination of dyadic one-on-one 
interactions gives rise to social groups, these results suggest that more complex social 
structure can emerge through cognitively complex behaviour. These findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis for communicative roots of complex sociality and cognition: as the 
complexity of cognitive skills underpinning communication increased, we would predict that 
primate species could live in more complex, structured social systems.  
Whilst there is clear evidence of flexibility in primate gestural communication (Byrne 
et al., 2017; Schneider et al., 2017), there is still debate as to the cognitive underpinnings of 
 
this flexibility in communication, and the cognitive abilities of non-human primates in 
general. Some researchers claim that non-human primates, and particularly some great ape 
species, have the ability to understand mental states in others (Krupenye et al., 2016), but 
others are more sceptical of such claims, arguing that behaviour that appears complex can 
have relatively simple cognition underpinning it (Barrett, 2016; Fischer & Price, 2017; 
Heyes, 2017; Leavens, Bard & Hopkins, 2017). For example, Fisher & Price (2017) argue 
that whilst primate vocalisations and gestures do appear to be goal-directed, there is a lack of 
evidence of communicative intent and propose that this is in line with the lack of solid 
evidence of mental-state understanding. In turn receivers use signals to predict the signaller’s 
behaviour, leading to a flexible communication system that is not underpinned by higher-
level mental-state understanding from either the signaller or the receiver. This view is 
consistent with studies that showed the relative difficulty of identifying theory of mind in 
primates such as evidence for false belief [e.g. chimpanzees (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Hare, 
Call & Tomasello, 2001; Kaminski, Call & Tomasello, 2008); chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan 
paniscus), human children (Krachun et al., 2009)] and deception [capuchin monkeys, Cebus 
capucinus (Wheeler & Hammerschmidt, 2013)]. More broadly, Barrett, Henzi & Rendall 
(2007) suggest that much of primate behaviour is not based on long-term durable social 
bonds between pairs of individuals underpinned by conceptual knowledge of these 
relationships that persists through time. Instead, Barrett et al. (2007) argue that primates 
make moment-by-moment adjustments to the current social situation, using social contact and 
proximity to achieve their immediate goals. Overall, therefore there is still ongoing debate 
both with regard to primate communication and primate cognition more generally as to the 
evidence for higher-level cognitive process in primates (intentionality in communication, 




V. USING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS TO EXAMINE THE LINK BETWEEN 
COMMUNICATION, COGNITION AND SOCIALITY  
To assess how communicative and cognitive complexity varies across different levels of 
social complexity, such as groups of differing sizes and with different levels of fission–fusion 
dynamics, requires a systematic way of defining, measuring and comparing social complexity 
across groups and species. Currently, there is a lack of such standardised measures of social 
complexity (Kappeler, 2019) and developing such a measure that can be applied across 
different species has been described as the ‘grail of social analysis’ (Whitehead, 2008, p. 20). 
One promising approach to developing such a measure is social network analysis, which 
provides a way quantitatively to describe the patterns of interactions in any social system and 
can be used to compare social structures both within and between species. A network models 
a system composed of individual nodes (in animal networks typically individuals) and the 
edges or ties between the nodes (in animal networks typically some aspect of the social 
relationship between the animals). In the last two decades, social network analysis has 
increasingly been used to study sociality in both primate (Kudo & Dunbar, 2001; Lehmann & 
Dunbar, 2009; Sueur et al., 2011) and non-primate species (Farine & Whitehead, 2015; 
Krause, Lusseau & James, 2009; Kurvers et al., 2014; Wey et al., 2008). 
Social network analysis may be particularly valuable in exploring the associations 
between communication, cognition and sociality in two key areas. First, network analysis can 
provide novel insights into the properties of social structure within and among groups that are 
not possible either by considering the interactions between pairs of individuals in isolation, or 
by studying the average properties of the group as a whole (Croft, James & Krause, 2007; 
Wey et al., 2008). For example, social network analysis has recently provided novel insights 
into the underlying social structure of western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) 
 
(Morrison et al., 2019), discovering a hierarchical social modularity in which the lower-level 
reproductive groups and solitary males are organised into higher-level social units, with a 
hierarchical scaling ratio similar to that found in other mammalian species (Hill et al., 2008). 
The precise, quantitative description of the social structure of primate groups possible with 
social network analysis is an important first step in developing measures of social complexity 
(Whitehead, 2008) and in then relating that complexity to patterns of communication. One 
key unresolved issue in comparing networks of different sizes both within and among species 
is that measures of network structure such as network density (the proportion of all possible 
ties that are present) are strongly related to overall network size (Farine & Whitehead, 2015; 
Faust, 2006; Faust & Skvoretz, 2002). More sophisticated statistical techniques for analysing 
social network data, and standardised ways of collecting, processing and analysing network 
data across different species, are needed to enable meaningful comparisons across networks 
of different sizes (Farine & Whitehead, 2015). 
Second, network analysis can provide insights into the range of behaviours animals 
use to build social relationships and regulate their social interactions. In complex social 
systems, animals interact in many different contexts and maintain a differentiated set of social 
relationships (Freeberg et al., 2012). There is a lack of consensus as to how to measure the 
nature of social relationships animals maintain with others, both in the broader field (Dunbar 
& Shultz, 2010; Silk, Cheney & Seyfarth, 2013) and in network analysis (Farine & 
Whitehead, 2015). In primates, most networks are based on proximity (S.G.B. Roberts & 
Roberts, 2016; Schel et al., 2013) and/or grooming (Koyama, Ronkainen & Aureli, 2017; 
Schel et al., 2013), with more recent research using rates of communication as the basis for 
the network (A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 2016; S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2016). These 
behaviours may have very different functions, with grooming used to build relationships 
(Dunbar, 2010; Keverne et al., 1989; Schino, 2007), and communication used to coordinate 
 
and regulate social interactions (Faraut et al., 2019; Fedurek et al., 2013, 2015; Mitani & 
Gros-Louis, 1998; A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 2016; S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2016). By 
contrast, proximity can be seen as the functional outcome of a relationship (i.e. two animals 
with a strong social bond will tend to associate with each other), rather than a mechanism 
used to build relationships or coordinate social interactions. 
One specific empirical question that can be addressed with social network analysis is 
the extent to which the networks formed by these different behaviours overlap. For example, 
Lehmann & Ross (2011) used social network analysis in wild baboons (Papio anubis) to 
examine the extent to which networks based on different social behaviours were similar to 
each other. Networks based on grooming showed little overlap with networks based on other 
social behaviours, such as displacement, presenting or aggression. However, individual 
baboons who were central in one behavioural network tended to be central in the other 
behavioural networks. Whilst this study revealed the complexity in the baboons’ social 
environment across affiliative, agonistic and sexual behaviours, it did not examine 
communication networks. Comparing the networks formed by different types of 
communication (e.g. gestures, low-amplitude vocalisations, high-amplitude vocalisations) 
will provide new insights into how primates use different types of communication to 
coordinate and regulate a differentiated set of social relationships (A.I. Roberts & Roberts, 
2016; S.G.B. Roberts & Roberts, 2016). In a complex social system, individuals may need to 
use a variety of different behavioural interactions (grooming, vocalisations, gestures, 
proximity and visual attention) to manage a differentiated set of social relationships, whereas 
in less-complex social systems individuals would use fewer types of behavioural interactions 
to manage their relationships. Thus the networks based on different behaviours will show less 
overlap in complex as compared to non-complex social systems.  
 
 Further, whilst much progress has been made assessing the archaeological record, the 
study of hominin social life is in its infancy (Dunbar, Gamble & Gowlett, 2014). As hominins 
are likely to have been characterised by a fission–fusion social system, and one of the trends 
in human evolution is of increasing group size over time, understanding how social network 
structure changes with increasing group size, and how this is affected by the social system, 
provides valuable insights into the evolution of human sociality (Grove, Pearce & Dunbar, 
2012). One key feature of complex social relationships of hominins is communication and the 
social network approach can be used to examine language evolution. To date, the lack of 
‘fossilisation’ of language prior to the arrival of writing has made it difficult to draw 
inferences about the presence and form of language in our hominid ancestors (Fitch, 2005). 
When exploring language evolution it is important to examine whether language evolved to 
increase effectiveness of locating referents in time and space, thereby reducing cognitive 
demands on contextual perception (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002). The studies of great 
apes indicate that the origins of cognitive skills underpinning language are in manual 
gestures, as primates have limited ability to voluntarily direct movement and attention of the 
recipient towards external objects and events through vocalisations (Bohn, Call & Tomasello, 
2019). When the earliest expansion of hominins from Africa to open, grassland habitats 
demanded larger group sizes to reduce mortality from predation (Prat, 2018), the challenges 
of social complexity may have precipitated evolution of voluntary control in vocal signals 
such as synchronized choruses combined with auditory gestures (Darwin, 1872/1965, Hillert, 
2016). These signals are highly rewarding (A. I. Roberts & Roberts, 2019b) and can refer to 
objects and events in the external environment (Boesch, 1991; Clark & Wrangham, 1994; 
Kalan, Mundry & Boesch, 2015). Thus as the social complexity increased, language 
evolution may have transitioned from manual gestures to ‘protosong’ (Darwin, 1872/1965): 
loud, auditory gestures (e.g. clapping) combined with synchronised choruses (e.g. 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-T8qJ9D1-g8). Network analysis provides new methods 
and a new approach with which to examine the archaeological record, with the focus on 
nodes (individuals or groups) and the ties (e.g. exchange of material culture, ideas, mates) 
between them. The network approach is just starting to be applied to language evolution, and 
using this approach could provide both the methods and the comparative framework of how 
social networks operate in primates to allow the potential of this network approach in the 
study of human evolution to be realised. 
Finally, a detailed understanding of the social structure of primates will aid in conservation 
management, and an assessment of how they are likely to react to changes in habitat through 
deforestation or climate change (Snijders et al., 2017). The role of habitat in influencing 
social structure has not been explored using social network approaches. However, habitat can 
influence the ability of the recipient to engage in social bonding by increasing the costs of 
processing information in the signals. For example, factors such as background noise, 
illumination, wind, habitat density can cause a distraction or factors such as temperature can 
influence metabolic costs of the recipient, leaving fewer cognitive resources that can be 
directed to processing contextual information and learning of the signals. Many primate 
species are classified as endangered, meaning that they are considered to be facing a very 
high risk of extinction in the wild. For instance, there are only around 700 mountain gorillas 
surviving today, all in the wild, and a recent survey has demonstrated an alarming fall in the 
population of wild chimpanzees. An urgent priority is thus to assess how future changes in 
habitat are likely to affect the social structure and long-term viability of primate species, to 
allow for effective planning of management and conservation strategies. How the social 
structure will change is dependent on the nature of the social network, the role of key 
individuals within the network, and the flexibility inherent in terms of both group size and 
social system (e.g. level of fission–fusion dynamics). A detailed understanding of the social 
 
networks of primates, and the role communication plays in these social networks, will 
provide an invaluable tool in ensuring a long-term future for our closest living relatives. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
(1) Although much progress has been made in assessing the archaeological record, our 
understanding of hominin social life is in its infancy. Primates are our closest living 
ancestors, and as such an improved understanding of the forces governing their sociality is 
important for providing insights into human social evolution (Aureli et al., 2008; Byrne et al., 
2017).  
(2) Fission–fusion dynamics characterise chimpanzee and bonobos, and also are typical of 
modern-day hunter–gatherers (Aureli et al., 2008). This suggests that fission–fusion 
dynamics were characteristic of the social system of the last common ancestor of 
chimpanzees, bonobos and modern humans (Aureli et al., 2008). Further, a general trend in 
the course of human evolution is an increase in brain size, and this is likely to have been 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in social group size (Aiello & Dunbar, 1993). 
However, the information-processing demands that drive the corresponding increase in brain 
size and group size are currently unclear.  
(3) We propose that cognitive demands behind the communication needed to form and 
maintain bonded social relationships in socially complex species is a key factor in explaining 
the link between social complexity and cognition. Specifically we propose that the evolution 
of cognitive complexity underpinning the production of signals is driven by the need to 
reduce the cognitive demands arising from the contextual perception of low-intensity signals 
in recipients. By making these signals more informative and rewarding, signallers increase 
the probability the recipient will produce the desired response. In particular, we emphasise 
that manual gesturing was a key innovation that may have facilitated the more complex social 
 
systems of primates (Roberts et al., 2014a, 2012b). We provide the first comprehensive 
review that explains why the complexity of cognitive skills underpinning communication is 
important for managing social relationships, relative to less-cognitively complex 
communication. We provide information about a set of recent advances that suggests that 
communication that facilitates bondedness (e.g. intentionality, referentiality) when social 
complexity increases and social bonds weaken (e.g. joint attention declines) enables primates 
to develop bonded social relationships in complex social settings (e.g. larger groups).  
(4) We argue that there is an asymptotic limit on the extent to which contextual perception of 
low-intensity signals can be effective when social complexity increases, and this leads to 
evolution of differentiated social relationships, whereby informative and rewarding signals 
come into play in facilitating complex sociality (Roberts et al., 2019b).  
(5) To date there is no evidence on how the complexity of cognitive skills underlying 
communication varies as a function of social complexity at the level of the group or social 
system. A comparison of social complexity (e.g. stable and fission–fusion societies) offers 
the opportunity to explore the challenges involved in regulating social relationships in more 
complex, as compared to less complex, social groups, and how this complexity changes in 
groups of different sizes. This will help us understand how the social structure is likely to 
have changed with increasing group size in the fission–fusion system of early hominins, and 
the cognitive complexity involved in managing groups of increasing size. Further, it will help 
to elucidate the origins of language.  
(6) To carry out both within- and among-species comparisons, we propose the use of social 
network analysis, which provides a novel way to describe and compare social structure. By 
applying social network analysis, a new systematic way of comparing social complexity 
across species can be achieved, something that is lacking in current comparative studies of 
social structure. Given that a fission–fusion system is likely to have characterised hominins, a 
 
comparison of the social and communicative complexity involved in fission–fusion and more 
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IX. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section 
at the end of the article. 
Video S1. Arm extension used to initiate an infant’s climbing onto the female’s back for 
travel. 
Video S2. Stretched extend gesture made with right hand towards the dominant individual 
during an aggressive event. 
Video S3. Chimpanzee using a mechanically ineffective tactile gesture for social bonding.  
Video S4. Synchronised high-intensity pant–hoot with drumming. 
  
 
Table 1. Complexity of cognitive skills underpinning communication and social complexity. 
 
Cognitive complexity variable Presence of communicative complexity within social relationships 
in: 
Bonded social system Non-bonded social system 
Vocalisations Present Present 
Gestures Present Absent  
Complexity of structure Present Absent  
Contextual perception Present Absent 
Intentionality Present Absent 
Referentiality  Present Absent 
Laterality Present Absent 
Learning and innovation Present Absent 
Arousal control Present Absent 













Source of recipient’s distraction/anxiety 
in complex social setting 
Group size Small  Large  Monitoring large number of social 
relationships 
Temporal and 
spatial stability of 
social system 
Stable  Fission–fusion  Monitoring social relationships based on 
irregular interactions as individuals 
encounter each other less often 
Group density  Low High  Tracking large number of third-party 
social relationships in the immediate 
audience  
Member roles Single role  Multiple roles  Monitoring social relationships across 




Despotic  Egalitarian  Monitoring partners with whom 
dominance relationships have been 
unresolved  
Mating system  Monogamous  Polygamous  Monitoring alternative mating partners 
such as dominant male 
Bondedness style Female bonded Male bonded Monitoring partners with whom kinship 




Fig. 1. Process of the formation and maintenance of social bonds. Top arrow indicates an 
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Fig. 2. Relationship between cognitive demands involved in the formation of social bonds 
through communication and social complexity. Top arrow indicates an increase in social 
complexity; bottom arrow indicates a decrease in social complexity.  
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Fig. 3. Social bond formation and learning exemplified through the ‘backward sweep’ 
gesture. (A) The infant recognises a link between the shape and movement of the hand/arm 
and the referent (lowered back) in a tactile domain; (B) the infant recognises a link between 
the shape and movement of the hand/arm and referent (lowered back) in visual space; (C) the 
infant recognises that the shape and movement of the hand/arm executed without the 
presence of a lowered back refers to a lowered back. Image credit: Naomi Machemer. 
 
 





Fig. 4. Social bonding/learning positive feedback loop. 
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